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01 Introduction
In a situation of ﬁnancial distress managers, acting as rational economic agents trying to resurrect
their company, may end up engaging in “last resort gambles”, that is, they employ an investment
strategy that, if successful, would save the company from insolvency, if unsuccessful, would make
liquidation unavoidable. On the verge of bankruptcy managers employ this strategy with the aim
to "weather out the storm", that is, they invest in risky projects trying to bridge bad and good
times.
In this context it is often diﬃcult to ascertain whether real investment are incurred with the
objective to manipulate earnings or just for strategic considerations. Failures at Enron, WorldCom
and Tyco in the US together with some other prominent companies in Europe (Vivendi, Ahold,
Adecco, Parmalat, etc.) are iconic examples of corporate scandals combined with excessive risk
taking which is inﬂuenced by moral hazard in the hopes of extraordinary returns that could rescue
a company from bankruptcy (Lev, 2003; Jensen, 2004).
In this paper we consider a manager who owns the ﬁrm and chooses the debt policy and
the liquidation policy. If the market is in a downturn the manager may exercise the option of
liquidating the company, leaving the claimants with a positive liquidation value. At each point in
time the manager faces also the opportunity to change the ﬁrm’s strategy by investing in a risky
project. Such investment project may be part of a diversiﬁcation strategy where the company
invests in activities not strictly related with its core business. Speciﬁcally, we assume that at
each point in time the project may either fail or not. In case of failure the company is inevitably
forced into bankruptcy. On the other hand, given that the project is active, the project may
either generate a positive cash ﬂow or nothing, where the positive cash ﬂow is assumed to be
independent of the demand levels since it is not related with the ﬁrm core business. We model the
failure probability and the positive cash ﬂow probability of the project (conditional on survival
of the project) as Poisson processes, where we assume that the lower (larger) is the mean waiting
1time of project failure, the lower (larger) is the mean waiting time of a ﬁrst payoﬀ. We show that
the opportunity cost of the project, represented by the loss if the project fails, depends positively
on the demand level. Since the expected gains from this risky investment strategy are independent
of the demand levels of the company core business while its opportunity costs are increasing in the
demand level, it turns out to be optimal to invest in this type of project in a market downturn.
Thus, we interpret this particular form of risk-taking as a “last resort gamble”, in that the ﬁrm is
thrown into a new venture that, if successful, would save the company from insolvency and let it
remain operative; if unsuccessful it would force the company into bankruptcy.
We characterize the ﬁrm’s optimal liquidation policy and optimal gambling strategy showing
reluctance of the manager to shut the company down. We use real option analysis to address the
problem of optimal liquidation and gambling decisions. Such methodology is most appropriate
since it allows us to model and quantify this risk-taking problem in a continuous time framework.
Real options represent the formal modeling technique which is more suitable to serve the purposes
of decision making in a dynamic context under uncertainty. Traditional static approaches are not
proper in the study of liquidation policies, because of the high uncertainty and costs of irreversible
decisions; moreover, they underestimate the upside potentials of the operational strategies. Real
options methods allow to incorporate all these elements of corporate policy.1
In this paper we abstract from agency problems arising from a conﬂict between managers and
equity-holders and analyze a model where the management owns the ﬁrm and a principal/agent
problem eventually arises between debt-holders and the ﬁrm. Conﬂicts between debt-holders
and equity-holders may arise because of the equity-holders incentive to invest in risky but poor
projects, aﬀecting the value of the debt. In this framework we study the impact of the company
indebtedness on the optimal liquidation policy and how capital structure and bankruptcy decisions
1 The literature on real options is vast. See, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Grenadier (2000), Schwartz
and Trigeorgis (2001) and Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) for the methodology of real options. We recall here only a few
recent contributions about investment, timing, agency and real options, that is, Grenadier and Wang (2005, 2007),
Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), Wong (2007). Our paper contributes to the debate about risk taking employing a
real option methodology which has not been used to study both liquidation policy and optimal gambling strategies.
2are aﬀected by the investment strategy.
The problem we tackle in this paper is closely related to the literature on moral hazard and
excessive risk-taking, for which many colorful descriptions have been used, namely “gambling
for resurrection”, “heads I win, tails I break even”, “fourth-quarter football”, etc. (Hart, 2000;
Akerlof and Romer, 1993).
Our paper is closely aligned with the literature on excessive continuation induced by equity-
holders’ limited liability when a moral hazard problem arises between equity- and debt-holders.
Knot and Vychodil (2006) examine debt contracting in the case of gambling for resurrection under
diﬀerent bankruptcy regimes in a 3-period model. They show that under the absolute priority rule
(such that nothing can be paid to a class of claimholders unless the claims of all superior classes
are satisﬁed) equity-holders tend toward excessive risk-taking and delaying bankruptcy ﬁling; in
contrast, a softer law or the possibility of creditors’ veriﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s situation mitigate
the problem of avoiding bankruptcy and represent an alternative solution to the gambling for
resurrection problem. Decamps and Faure-Grimaud (2002), using a compound exchange option
model, study a setting where excessive continuation always occur and such excessive continuation
is even exacerbated as debt repayment increases. In our paper excessive continuation results from
the last resort gamble strategy employed by the manager. We ﬁnd excessive continuation both
in the all-equity ﬁrm and in the case where an agency problem between equity- and debt-holders
may arise.
The issue we address is linked to the asset substitution problem ﬁrst discussed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), where the equity-holders wish to switch to a riskier portfolio after debt is issued,
to transfer value from debt to equity2 . This action leads to a delay in liquidation and excessive
continuation. In Leland (1998) a ﬁrm can choose between two exogenous levels of the volatility of
its value. In the leveraged case, it is shown that the choice which is optimal before issuing debt is
2 The asset substitution problem has been much developed in the agency literature. Galai and Masulis (1976)
ﬁrst pointed out that a shareholder aligned manager faced with a choice between two diﬀerent projects would invest
in the project of higher variance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) even raise the possibility of a manager investing in
a negative NPV investment for the sake of increasing the volatility of the ﬁrm’s assets.
3not the same after debt has been issued. Our problem is similar to asset substitution in the sense
that the manager switches to a riskier project with his last resort gamble strategy. In the case of
asset substitution equity-holders beneﬁt from an increased upside volatility by engaging in riskier
project. In our case, because of the last resort gamble strategy, equity-holders may beneﬁt from
increased current cash ﬂows if the project is successful at the cost of an increased downside risk.
Our model is more concerned with "real" asset substitution rather than with "ﬁnancial" asset
substitution since we consider a ﬁrm’s real option of changing its strategy into a new branch of
activity through its last resort gamble strategy. Real asset substitution instead of ﬁnancial asset
substitution has been studied also in Decamps and Djembissi (2007) where the authors tackle
the problem of a company facing the option to switch irreversibly to a "poor" project, that is
an activity whose cash ﬂow dynamics are characterized by a geometric Brownian motion with a
larger volatility and a lower drift.
Excessive risk-taking and bankruptcy postponing tendency of managers are often inextricably
linked with a tendency of the management to misreporting. In some cases gambling for resurrec-
tion involves unlawful risk-taking, which means that it is a complementary strategy to earnings
manipulation and corporate fraud3 . When faced with the threat of ﬁring, liquidation or in order
to increase the value of stock options, managers are encouraged to take substantial risk and to
boost short term proﬁt through legal and sometimes fraudulent means. In some cases (see John-
son, Ryan and Tian, 2006) executives commit fraud to avoid under-performance resulting from
signiﬁcant slowdowns in their earnings growth, so that frauds are committed more likely during
industry downturns.
Research on the determinants of fraud has indicated external ﬁnancial needs (Povel, Singh and
Winton, 2007), proximity to debt covenant violations and executive compensation as the main
causes for violations of accounting principles and earnings manipulation. A few recent papers
3 Earnings manipulation has been discussed in several papers, among them we recall Stein (1989), Narayanan
(1985) and Von Thadden (1995).
4have examined the relation between executive equity-based compensation and corporate fraud
(Goldman and Slezak, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Gao and
Shrieves, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004; Johnson, Ryan and Tian, 2006; Erickson,Hanlon
and Maydew, 2006), and have emphasized that executives at fraud ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly large
equity-based compensation and greater ﬁnancial incentives to commit fraud than executives at
non-fraud ﬁrms. Anecdotal evidence suggests that analysts, investors and ﬁnancial markets com-
mentators often focus on ﬁrms’ abilities to consistently increase earnings per share. A few papers
have highlighted how earnings manipulation is not directly linked to an agency problem between
managers and equity-holders (Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong, 2005, 2006; Friebel and Guriev,
2005), and have found that top-management and initial shareholders have often aligned interests
in over-reporting short-term earnings, because they can sell stocks at higher prices to uninformed
outside investors who base their evaluations on the accounting reports.
We study how last resort gambles inﬂuence liquidation policy and the interaction between the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure, gambling and closure decisions. In Section 2 we study the value of the
ﬁrm if the ﬁrm faces the option of investing in a risky project, trying to boost current proﬁts
at the cost of liquidation, if the project fails. We ﬁnd that engaging in this gamble is optimal
in a market downturn: it increases the ﬁrm value and aﬀects the ﬁrm’s closure policy, delaying
liquidation. Thus, in engaging in a last resort gamble, the ﬁrm bets on a market upturn, trying
to bridge good and bad times.
In Section 3 we extend the basic setting to the case where the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by issuing debt
and equity and where it must pay interest to its creditors continuously. We derive the equity-
holders and debt-holders claims and study how the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure inﬂuences optimal
liquidation and gambling policies. Last resort gambling boosts the equity value, inducing a delay
in liquidation. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that increasing the ﬁrm’s indebtedness speeds up liquidation.
Debt ﬁnancing mitigates the conﬂict between share- and debt-holders because debt service reduces
the amount of free cash ﬂows available to equity-holders (Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986). A larger
5indebtedness reduces the equity-holders’ gains from a last resort gamble, reducing the appeal of
such a strategy. We ﬁnd that increasing the company’s indebtness reduces the range of demand
levels for which it is optimal to engage in a last resort gamble. Moreover, we ﬁnd a threshold level
for the debt above which engaging in last resort gambling is never optimal. The intuition behind
this result is the following. A last resort gamble, increasing the downside risk, makes the company
discount future proﬁts at a higher discount rate. Consequently, an increase in the coupon value
increases the burden of debt service with a last resort gamble more than without a last resort
gamble, reducing the incentives to invest in such a project. Moreover, for a suﬃciently large
coupon value the beneﬁts of a last resort gamble are more than oﬀset by its cost in terms of debt
burden and thus it is never optimal to invest in such a project. We compare the debt value in the
case of a last resort gamble and in the case where a last resort gamble is not available. We show
that a last resort gamble has an ambiguous eﬀect on the debt value and the debt capacity of the
company. The delay in liquidation due to the risky investment strategy increases the probability
that the company is going to service the debt and increases the debt value (delay-in-liquidation
eﬀect). On the other hand, the increased downside risk associated with the gamble reduces the
debt value (increased downside risk eﬀect) and thus the overall eﬀect is ambiguous. We discuss
which of the two eﬀects prevail according to the parameter values, and, in particular, we show
that the diﬀerence between the two debt values depends, among others, on the coupon value. A
larger coupon value reduces the distortions induced by a last resort gamble and consequently it is
more likely that last resort gambles increase the debt value.
In Section 4 we address the question of how an endogenous capital structure interacts with
liquidation and gambling strategies. We model the beneﬁts of debt issuance by introducing tax-
ation so that the ﬁrm can take advantage of the tax shield on the coupon payment. Through
numerical simulations we ﬁnd that the coupon value that maximizes the ﬁrm value at time zero is
increasing in the marginal tax rate and in the initial demand level. As a consequence, the larger
is the marginal tax rate and/ or the initial demand level, the lower is the range of demand levels
6for which it is optimal to engage in a last resort gamble and the lower are the distortions in the
liquidation policy induced by such a strategy.
Section 5 generalizes the model to the scenario where diﬀerent degrees of gambling intensities
are possible. While in Section 3 the ﬁrm can choose between engaging in a last resort gamble or
not, in Section 5 we introduce a choice between diﬀerent gambling intensities. We ﬁnd that as the
ﬁrm’s indebtedness increases, gambling intensity decreases.
Section 6 contains the conclusion and ﬁnal remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
A ﬁrm generates total operating proﬁts of Kxt − f, where f is a ﬁxed cost, K is a constant
parameter, xt a geometric Brownian motion representing exogenous demand shocks
dxt = µxtdt + σxtdBt
µ is a drift term and σ measures volatility. As x falls, the ﬁrm faces the opportunity to close the
activity irreversibly and is left with a constant liquidation value. Let H be the constant liquidation
value of the ﬁrm net of bankruptcy costs. It is assumed that at each time period the ﬁrm can
engage in a risky project which boosts current proﬁts if successful at the cost of liquidation in case
of failure. The ﬁrm acts to maximize the present value of the expected cash ﬂows. In this section
we specify the value of the ﬁrm in the absence of debt. Then, in Section 3, both the debt policy
and the closure policy are considered and the value of the ﬁrm and the debt-holders’ claims are
speciﬁed.
At each time period the ﬁrm may invest in a risky project trying to inﬂate current operating
proﬁts at the cost of bankruptcy if the project fails. In particular, we assume that there are
i = 0,1,2,... projects available, corresponding to diﬀerent gambling strategies. In investing in
a risky project the company incurs certain costs of size κi. If the project fails then bankruptcy
is forced; if the project survives then it may either generate a positive cash ﬂow or nothing.
7We model the project failure and the positive cash ﬂow event as Poisson processes with mean
arrival rate pi and
γi
1+pi, respectively, with pi,γi > 0. Thus, over a given time period of length
τ, the probability that the project does not fail is e−piτ and, given that the project survived, the
probability that the project pays a positive amount oﬀ is 1−e
−
γi
1+pi τ. Hence, over an inﬁnitesimal
time interval dt the probability of project failure is pidt and the probability of success, given that
the project survived, is
γi
1+pidt. The mean waiting time of a project failure, which in turn induces
the company bankruptcy, is 1
pi while the mean waiting time of a ﬁrst success is
1+pi
γi and thus the
larger is pi, the lower is the mean waiting time of bankruptcy and the larger is the mean waiting
time of success. Thus, the larger is pi, the lower is also the payoﬀ frequency of the project, given
its survival. In other words, the lower the survival probability of the project, the lower is also its
positive payoﬀ probability4 . We assume that if the project is successful, then its positive payoﬀ
is K and the expected value of the project is positive, i.e.
γi
1+piK − κi > 0.5 Notice that the
expected gains from the risky investment is independent of x, since it is an industrial project not
related with the core business activity of the ﬁrm. We set γ0 = 0, p0 = 0 and κ0 = 0. Thus,





1+pi and pi+1 > pi, for each i ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we
normalize κi = 0 for each i > 0 and thus interpret
γi
1+piKdt as the net expected payoﬀ of project i
over an inﬁnitesimal time interval dt. Note that as γi increases, that is the capability of boosting
current proﬁts by investing in the project increases, the probability of failure over an inﬁnitesimal
time period dt (and thus the riskiness of the project) has to increase in order to maintain the
diﬀerent gambling strategies relevant. We refer to γi as a measure of the intensity of the gambling
strategy. By investing in a risky project a company tries to increase its current proﬁts at the cost
of increasing the downside risk.
4 As will be shown further on, this assumption implies that for each γi > 0 there exists a ﬁnite threshold for
pi such that for pi larger than this threshold it is never optimal to invest in the risky project since the increased
downside risk and the associated expected loss is larger than the project expected gain.
5 For simplicity, the positive payoﬀ is normalized to K, the size parameter which appears in the expression of
the total operative proﬁts. As will be made clearer further on, it is not a restriction and what matters for the
optimal gambling and liquidation strategies is that the expected value of the project is positive.
8In this section we consider only two projects 0 and 1, that is, the company may either employ
a gambling strategy (invest in project 1) or not (invest in project 0). In Section 5 we extend the
framework to the case where the company may choose between diﬀerent gambling intensities.
Let V i (x), i = 0,1, be the company value in the case the ﬁrm invests in a risky project (i = 1)
and in the case the ﬁrm does not (i = 0). We assume that all investors are risk-neutral. The ﬁrm
value V i (x) satisﬁes the following equilibrium condition6
rV i = Kx +
γi
1 + pi





H − V i￿
(1)
for i = 0,1 and where r is the risk-free interest rate with r > µ.
Note that while the expected gains from the gamble,
γ1
1+p1K, are constant and independent of
x, the loss in case of failure,
￿
V 1 − H
￿
, depends on x. It will be shown that V 1 is increasing in x
and hence the opportunity cost of engaging in last resort gambles (p1
￿
V 1 − H
￿
) is increasing in
x. Thus, the lower (larger) is x, the larger (lower) are the relative expected gains from the risky
investment. It will be shown that engaging in the gamble is optimal for suﬃciently low values of
x.
In what follows we shall use the notation:







r + pi − µ
r + pi
(2)




σ2λi (λi − 1) = r + pi (3)
for i = 0,1.
Over an inﬁnitesimal time period dt, if the expected gains from investing in the risky project
(K
γ1
1+p1dt) are suﬃciently low while the probability of the project failure (p1dt) is suﬃciently large
(i.e. the mean waiting time of the project failure is suﬃciently low) then investing in this risky
project is never optimal. On the other hand, if the expected gains from investing in the risky
6 See, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) Section 5.B.
9project are suﬃciently large while the probability of project failure is suﬃciently low then it is
never optimal to exercise the option of liquidating the company. Thus, in order to rule out the
trivial cases throughout the paper we make the following assumption.


























Assumption 1 poses restrictions on the parameter values p1 and γ1. In particular, for each
value p1, Assumption 1 deﬁnes an upper and a lower bound for the parameter value γ1 such that
both the closure problem and the gambling option remain relevant, respectively. To see this, we
observe that a too large value of γ1 leads to a violation of the ﬁrst inequality, posing an upper
bound on the value of γ1. If γ1 is very large, then expected "inﬂated" proﬁts are such that the
optimal closure problem becomes irrelevant. On the other hand, a too low value of γ1 leads to
an infringement of the second inequality 7 , setting a lower bound on the value of γ1. A too
low gambling intensity makes the option to engage in a last resort gambling strategy unattractive
since the increased downside risk and the opportunity costs associated with the risky investment
are larger then the expected gains. On the other hand, for each γ1 Assumption 1 poses an upper
bound for the parameter value p1, say p1: a too large value of p1 leads to an infringement of
the second inequality. A too large failure probability of the risky project and a too low payoﬀ
probability (
γ1
1+p1) imply that the expected costs of the project due to the increased downside risk,
are larger than the expected gains8 .
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal ﬁrm value:







each value of p1 > 0.




r , the second inequality of Assump-














r+p1 is strictly increasing in p1 there exists a ﬁnite threshold p1 such that the
second inequality of Assumption 1 is satisﬁed for values of p1 lower than this threshold.





V 0 (x) for x ≥ x0
V 1 (x) for ￿ x1 ≤ x < x0
H for x < ￿ x1
where
















































where ￿ x1 is deﬁned in (2) and x0 is the solution of F (x) = 0, where



























and where Assumption 1 guarantees that x0 > ￿ x1. Moreover, ∂x0
∂p1 < 0 and ∂x0




Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 1 identiﬁes two thresholds, the ﬁrst (￿ x1) being the closure cut-oﬀ level and the
second (x0) being a gamble cut-oﬀ level. If demand is suﬃciently large (i.e. x > x0), the company
chooses not to engage in the risky investment. If demand decreases to intermediate values (i.e.
for ￿ x1 < x ≤ x0), then gambling becomes optimal. The company tries to boost current proﬁts,
betting on a recovery of demand and thus trying to bridge good and bad times. If demand
decreases further (i.e., x ≤ ￿ x1), closure becomes optimal.
The ﬁrm’s values as described in (4) - (5) have a straightforward interpretation. The ﬁrst and
the second term in (4) represent the present value of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow, the third expression
in round brackets represents the option value of engaging in a last resort gamble, and the forth
expression in round brackets represents the option value of shutting the ﬁrm down. The ﬁrst and
the second term in (5) represent the expected present value of the inﬂated cash ﬂow. Note that
in this case the values are discounted at a larger rate since the risky project fails with probability
11p1dt over the inﬁnitesimal time interval dt, in which case the company goes bankrupt. The third
expression in round brackets in (5) represents the option value of closure.
Observe that V (x) is increasing in x and therefore the loss if the risky project fails, is increasing
in x as well.
An increase in the failure frequency of the risky project (an increase in p1) or a reduction in the
gambling intensity (γ1) speeds up liquidation and reduces the range of values for x where engaging
in last resort gambling is optimal, that is it increases ￿ x1 and reduces x0. The intuition for this
result is quite straightforward. An increase in p1 increases the opportunity cost of investing in
the risky project and the expected gains from the project, while a reduction in γ1 reduces the
expected gains from the project. Hence, as p1 (γ1) increases (decreases), the eﬀectiveness of the
project in terms of boosting the ﬁrm value is reduced and consequently the incentives to invest in
this project are reduced. Note that a violation of the second inequality in Assumption 1 implies
that ￿ x1 ≥ ￿ x0. In this case, it follows from Proposition 1 that investing in the risky project is
never optimal. The company value is larger if it does not engage in a last resort gamble even if
it is available and, consequently, liquidation is optimal once exogenous demand decreases below
the liquidation threshold ￿ x0. In other words, the risky investment is ineﬀective in delaying the
company’s liquidation. In particular, as the project failure probability p1 reaches the upper bound
set by Assumption 1 (i.e. p1 → p1), the range of values for x where it is optimal to invest in the
risky project becomes inﬁnitesimal small and ﬁnally vanishes for p1 = p1.
We compare the result with the case where a last resort gamble is not available. We denote



















where ￿ x0 is deﬁned in (2).
Proposition 2 . If a last resort gamble is not available, then closure occurs at ￿ x0, where ￿ x0 > ￿ x1.
9 See also Proposition 1 in Lambrecht and Myers (2005, 2007).
12Proof. It follows from Assumption 1.
Thus, the ﬁrm closes later, if it can engage in a last resort gamble. The company invests in a
risky project, trying to inﬂate current proﬁts and thus delays the ﬁrm’s liquidation.
A ﬁnal remark concerns the eﬀect of volatility on closure.
Remark 1 An increase in the volatility parameter σ2 decreases the closure thresholds ￿ x1 and
￿ x0.
The intuition is that as volatility increases, so does the value of the ﬁrm for a given closure
threshold. With the terminology of real option theory, the premium to keep the closure option
alive is weaker. This lowers the thresholds ￿ x1 and ￿ x0.
3 Debt and Equity
In this section we suppose that the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by issuing debt and equity and examine
the eﬀect of debt on the closure and gambling decisions. We assume that debt guarantees the
payment of a constant perpetual coupon C unless liquidation occurs. The liquidation value, net
of bankruptcy costs, is denoted by H. Two cases can be distinguished: (i) risk-free debt, where
the company’s liquidation value covers the value of the debt (H ≥ C
r ), so that debt is fully
collateralized, and (ii) risky debt, where the company’s liquidation value is insuﬃcient (H < C
r ).
Let E (x) denote the equity-holders’ claim and D(x) the debt-holders’ claim.







1+piK + C + f
K
r + pi − µ
r + pi
(7)





and i ∈ {0,1}. Observe that as long as debt is risk-free x∗
i = ￿ xi,
while if debt is risky then x∗
i > ￿ xi.
Consider ﬁrst the case of risk-free debt. We denote by e(x) the payout policy to equity-
holders, being e(x) = Kx−f −C as long as the company remains operative and rH −C in case
13of liquidation. We denote by d(x) the payout policy to debt-holders, where d(x) = C. It is easy
to see that




where V (x) is deﬁned in Proposition 1. Thus, as long as debt is risk-free, the company’s closure
and gambling strategies are not aﬀected by its capital structure.
Consider next the case of risky debt. Now, the payout policy to equity-holders is e(x) =
Kx − f − C, as long as the company remains operative, and 0 in case of liquidation, while the
payout policy to debt-holders is d(x) = C as long as the company remains operative, and rH in
the case of liquidation. The following Proposition can be proved:
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1 is deﬁned in (7) and x0R is the solution of FR (x) = 0, where












































































∂p1 < 0 and ∂x0R
∂γ1 > 0, while
∂x∗
1




(ii) For coupon values C ≥ ￿ C engaging in a last resort gamble is never optimal and closure occurs
for x ≤ x∗
0, where x∗
0 is deﬁned in (7).
(iii) The critical coupon value ￿ C depends negatively on p1, i.e. ∂ ￿ C
∂p1 < 0.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The coupon value is critical for the company’s decision to engage or not to engage in a last
resort gamble. For suﬃciently low coupon values, engaging in a last resort gamble is optimal
in the case of a market downturn (i.e. for low values of x). Thus, the company tries to inﬂate
current proﬁts betting on a market upturn. For suﬃciently large coupon values engaging in a last
resort gamble is never optimal. In this case, equity-holders are not able to gain from the gambling
strategy which may beneﬁt debt-holders, and thus it becomes an unattractive option. Moreover,
akin to the results shown in the previous section, last resort gambles introduce a distortion in
liquidation decision. If a last resort gamble is not available, then closure occurs for values of x
lower than x∗
0, where for each C < ￿ C, x∗
1 < x∗
0. Thus, last resort gambles delay liquidation.
The intuition behind the role of the threshold ￿ C and the importance of the coupon value for
the gambling and liquidation strategy is the following. For p1 > 0 and C < ￿ C, the eﬀect of C on
the closure threshold is stronger if last resort gambles are available than if they are not, and this
eﬀect is stronger the larger is p1. Indeed, since the risky investment increases the downside risk,
it makes the company discount future proﬁts at a higher discount rate (i.e. r + p1 instead of r).
Consequently, the burden of an increase in the coupon value is larger, the larger is p1. Thus, there
exists a C = ￿ C such that x∗
1 = x∗
0, that is, the threshold for the demand level below which the
company decides to liquidate its activity is the same with and without the last resort gamble. In
this case the last resort gamble is ineﬀective in delaying liquidation since the increased burden of
debt service exactly compensates the expected gains from the risky investment and hence nothing
is gained from investing in the risky project. For C > ￿ C we have that the increased debt burden
15more than compensates the expected gains from the gamble and hence it is not optimal to invest
in the project.
The eﬀects of p1 and γ1 on the gambling and closure decision are similar to those described in
the previous section. An increase in the downside risk due to a last resort gamble (an increase in
p1) or a reduction in the gambling intensity (γ1) speeds up liquidation and reduces the range of
values for x where engaging in last resort gambling is optimal, that is it increases x∗
1 and reduces
x0R.
The expressions of equity and debt values have a straightforward interpretation. The ﬁrst two
terms of E1 (x) represent the present value of cash ﬂow, given that the company engages in a
last resort gamble; the other terms of E1 (x) represent the closure option. Analogously, the ﬁrst
three terms of E0 (x) represent the present value of proﬁts, given that the ﬁrm does not invest
in the risky project; the second expression in brackets represents the last resort gambling option
value while the third part represents the closure option. The debt value can be interpreted in






can be interpreted as the probability that the manager






) can be interpreted as the
probability that this event does not occur. Consider ﬁrst D1 (x) where the company employs the
last resort gamble strategy. C
r+p1 represents the present value of the constant perpetual coupon
C, given that the company is not liquidated, where the discount factor takes into account the fact
that the project fails over the inﬁnitesimal time interval dt with probability p1dt;
p1H
r+p1 represents
the present value of the liquidation value if the risky project fails, given that the company is
not liquidated. Thus, the ﬁrst part of D1 (x) represents the debt value if the company is not
liquidated, while the second part consists of the expected debt value in the case of liquidation.
The debt value D0 (x), corresponding to the case where the company does not employ the last
resort gamble strategy, consists of three parts. The ﬁrst represents the present value of debt, given
that the company does not engage in a last resort gamble, the second expression represents the
10 This probability is diﬀerent from the case where bankruptcy is induced by the failure of the risky project.
16debt value due to the company’s gambling option and the ﬁnal term represents the debt value
due the company’s liquidation option. Note that in the case of risky debt (C
r > H) the third
expression is always negative.
A further remark concerns the optimality of the liquidation threshold x∗
1 from a "social" point
of view. Notice that
∂E1(x)
∂x∗




2 < 0, that is, the choice of the closure threshold x∗
1
is optimal for equity-holders. On the contrary,
∂V (x)
∂x∗
1 < 0, where V (x) is the overall value of the
ﬁrm, that is, V (x) = E(x) + D(x). Since in this framework the socially optimal bankruptcy
trigger is the one that maximizes the overall value of the ﬁrm V (x), we get that, when equity-
holders choose the timing of bankruptcy and the ﬁrm has issued debt, then the socially optimal
bankruptcy strategy cannot be achieved, that is, x∗
1 is not socially optimal. The cause is equity-








1 < 0 the
"socially optimal" liquidation threshold is lower than x∗
1.11
The following Remark can be proved straightforwardly.
Remark 2. Since under risky debt C > rH, liquidation occurs earlier than with risk-free debt,
or an unleveraged ﬁrm, i.e. x∗
1 > ￿ x1.
Observe that the closure threshold x∗
1 is increasing in the coupon value C. Thus, debt speeds
up closure: the leveraged ﬁrm closes earlier than the unleveraged one. Remark 2 is in keeping
with what is established in the "debt overhang problem" literature (Myers, 1977).
In Figure12 1 we depict an example with two diﬀerent coupon values C1 > C0. For coupon
value C0 (C1), investing in a risky project is optimal for values of x ∈ (x1 (C0),x0R (C0)) (x ∈
(x1 (C1),x0R (C1))), while for values of x ≥ x0R (C0) (x ≥ x0R (C1)) it is not. Note that x0R (C0)−
11 In view of this remark and following Leland (1994), one can study how to design debt contracts where debt is
protected by positive net worth covenant and determine the optimal covenant rule. See also Decamps and Djembissi
(2007) for a discussion of optimal covenant rules.
12 Throughout the paper the parameter values used in the simulations, if not stated otherwise, are σ = .25,
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Figure 1: Equity values E1 (x), dashed line, and E0 (x), dotted line, for coupon values C0 (black
line) and C1 (grey line) with C0 = 10, C1 = 20.
x∗
1 (C0) > x0R (C1) − x∗
1 (C1) and thus a larger coupon value reduces the range of values for x
where engaging in a last resort gamble is optimal. Closure is optimal for values of x ≤ x∗
1 (C0)
(x ≤ x∗
1 (C1)). Thus, an increase in the coupon value speeds up liquidation (x∗
1 (C0) < x∗
1 (C1)).
The following proposition states this result more formally.
Proposition 4 Increasing the coupon value C reduces the range of values where employing a last
resort gamble strategy is optimal (i.e. x0R−x∗
1 is decreasing in C) and the distortion in liquidation
induced by last resort gambles (i.e. x∗
0 − x∗
1 is decreasing in C).
Proof. In the Appendix.
As we explained above, the driving mechanism of the result that x∗
0 − x∗
1 is decreasing in the
coupon value C is that the debt burden increases more with a last resort gamble than without,
because of an increased downside risk in the former case. The same mechanism drives also the
result that x0R−x∗
1 is decreasing in the coupon value: the increased downside risk associated with
the gamble leads to a larger burden if the coupon value is increased, reducing the incentives to
18   
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Figure 2: Liquidation (black line) and gambling (grey line) thresholds as a function of the coupon
value C.
engage in a last resort gamble. This eﬀect is stronger, the larger is p1 (i.e. x0R −x∗
1 is decreasing
in p1 as shown in Proposition 3).
In Figure 2 we depict the liquidation (black line) and the gambling (grey line) threshold as
a function of the coupon value C. For each C < ￿ C the gambling threshold is larger than the
liquidation threshold (i.e. x∗
1 < x0R) and thus the last resort gamble strategy is optimal for values
of x between these two thresholds. As C increases both the gamble and the liquidation threshold
increase while the diﬀerence between the two decreases, reducing the values of x where last resort
gambling is optimal. For the coupon value C ≥ ￿ C investing in the risky project is never optimal.




As asset risk rises, so does the value of equity for a given closure threshold. Hence, equity-
holders’ incentive to default on the interest payment, i.e. on the premium to keep the option alive
19is weaker. Notice that
∂E(x)
∂σ2 > 0, as long as bankruptcy has not been declared, that is, equity
value is enhanced by greater risk in case of debt. This lowers the triggers x∗
1 and x∗
0. Notice that
the eﬀect of σ2 on x∗
1 has the same sign of the eﬀect of γ1.
We investigate how a last resort gamble strategy aﬀects the debt value comparing the debt
value in the case of a last resort gamble strategy and the case where these are not available. If




















, for x > x∗
0
H, for x ≤ x∗
0
That is, the value of risky debt equals the value of the risk-free debt C
r times the probability that
bankruptcy does not occur plus the value of the proceeds from asset liquidation in the event of
bankruptcy H times the probability of bankruptcy. To see how risky investments aﬀect the debt
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1 < x ≤ x∗
0
0, for x ≤ x∗
1
Consider ﬁrst the case x∗
1 < x ≤ x∗
0, where the company is liquidated if a last resort gamble is
not available, while the company is gambling for resurrection if a risky investment opportunity is
available. In this case ∆D(x,C) is always positive. A last resort gamble delays liquidation and
hence increases the probability that the debt will be repaid, increasing the debt value. Note that
the larger is the default probability of the gamble p1, the larger is the liquidation threshold (i.e.
the earlier closure occurs) and consequently the lower is ∆D(x,C), for x∗
1 < x ≤ x∗
0. For values of
x larger than x∗
0 it may happen that ∆D(x,C) is negative. Consider, for example, the case where
x∗
0 < x ≤ x0R where the company remains operative if both a last resort gamble is available and
if it is not. The diﬀerence in the debt values ∆D(x,C) depends on the diﬀerence between the
20two probabilities that the company is going to service the debt (term in curled brackets). If the
company invests in a last resort gamble then this probability depends on the failure probability






, while if a last resort gamble is not available then the default probability depends just on






. While the probability
that the company decides to liquidate is lower if the company invests in the risky project (delay-in-
liquidation eﬀect), the increased downside risk due to the last resort gamble increases the default
probability (increased-downside-risk eﬀect), leading to an ambiguous eﬀect. For p1 → 0 the delay-
in-liquidation eﬀect dominates and hence ∆D(x,C) > 0 for x∗
0 < x ≤ x0R. The larger is the
failure probability p1 the lower is the probability that the company is going to service the debt in
the presence of a last resort gamble and thus the more likely it is that ∆D(x,C) is negative for
some values of x∗
0 < x ≤ x0R. For large values of x the probability that the company decides to
close the company down (with and without last resort gambles available) is negligible and hence
the delay-in-liquidation eﬀect is small. If the diﬀerence x0R − x∗
0 is suﬃciently large (this may
happen, for example, for large values of γ1 and a low coupon value), then the company may still
engage in a last resort gamble. In this case the increased-downside-risk eﬀect associated with
the risky investment dominates the delay-in-liquidation eﬀect leading to a negative ∆D(x,C). In















, and consequently ∆D(x,C) < 0 for
x > x0R and also for some values of x∗
0 < x ≤ x0R. This result is in keeping with Leland and Toft
(1996), where it is shown that the incentives for increasing risk become positive for equity holders
and debt holders as bankruptcy is approached and that the incentives to increase risk become
positive for equity holders before they become positive for debt holders.
We summarize this discussion in the following remark.
Remark 4. A last resort gamble strategy changes the debt value according to the composition
of the delay-in-liquidation and the increased-downside-risk eﬀects.
21The coupon value has an important role on the diﬀerence ∆D(x,C). A larger coupon value,
reducing the incentives to engage in a last resort gamble and reducing the distortion induced by
this strategy (see Proposition 4), increases the probability that ∆D(x,C) is positive.
A related issue concerns the debt capacity of the ﬁrm, that is, the maximal value of total
debt13 . For a given value of x, we study how the debt value D(x) and ∆D(x,C) change as a
function of the coupon value C. Note that the debt capacity is increasing in x: the larger is the
exogenous demand level, the larger is the debt capacity. For C ≤ rH the debt is risk-free and thus
for C = rH the debt value is H. For C > rH the debt is risky and for a suﬃciently large coupon
value C￿￿ the company defaults on its debt. Thus, since the debt value is a continuous function of
C, there exists a C ∈ (rH,C￿￿) where the debt value is maximized.
Observe that ∆D(x,C) = 0 as long as the debt is risk-free. Once debt becomes risky, the
option of engaging in a last resort gamble has an ambiguous eﬀect on the debt capacity, depending,
amongst others, on the value of x. For low values of x, as it has been argued above, the delay-in-
liquidation eﬀect dominates the increased-downside-risk eﬀect and thus the option of engaging in
a last resort gamble increases the company’s debt capacity. On the other hand, for large values of
x, the increased-downside-risk eﬀect dominates the delay-in-liquidation eﬀect and thus the option
of engaging in a last resort gamble reduces the company’s debt capacity for some values of C. The
larger is C, the lower are the incentives to engage in a last resort gamble and so are the distortions
induced by it and, as a consequence, the more likely it is that ∆D(x,C) is positive.
In Figure 3 we depict two examples based on the numerical example of Figure 2 where we plot
D(x) (black line) and ∆D(x,C) ∗ 100 (grey line)14 as functions of C for two diﬀerent values of
x. For small values of C the debt is risk free (black continuous line). Increasing the value of C the
debt becomes risky but the company does not engage in a last resort gamble (black dashed line for
D(x) and grey dashed line for ∆D(x,C) ∗ 100); increasing further C engaging in the last resort
13 See Kim (1978) and Leland (1994) for a deﬁnition and a discussion of the concept of debt capacity.
14 We consider ∆D(x,C)∗ 100 instead of ∆D (x,C) in order to be able to plot D (x) and ∆D(x,C) together in
the same graph.
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Figure 3: Debt capacity. Debt value D(x,C) (black line) and ∆D(x,C) ∗ 100 (grey line) as a
function of C with x = 0.295 (RHS) and x = 0.18 (LHS).
gamble becomes optimal (black dotted line for D(x) and grey dotted line for ∆D(x,C) ∗ 100).
In Figure 3 we put x = 0.18 and x = 0.295. We observe that in the ﬁrst case the debt capacity
is lower than in the second case, and furthermore the last resort gamble increases the debt capacity
in the ﬁrst case while in the second case it decreases the debt capacity for low values of C and
increases the debt capacity for large values of C.
The debt capacity is relevant to determine the debt contract at an initial time. If x at time 0
is relatively large, then the option of engaging in a last resort gamble reduces the company’s debt
capacity and consequently has a negative eﬀect on the ﬁrm value.
4 Endogenous capital structure: some remarks
In the previous section we considered the capital structure as exogenous and made some compara-
tive statics analyses to show how optimal last resort gambling and liquidation policies are aﬀected
by the company’s indebtedness. In this section we address the question of how an endogenous
capital structure interacts with liquidation and gambling strategies. The simplest way to tackle
this question and to model the beneﬁts of debt issuance is to introduce taxation so that the ﬁrm
can take advantage of the tax shield on the coupon payment.
Let τ be the marginal corporate tax rate. Consider ﬁrst the case of risk-free debt. The payout
policy to equity-holders is e(x) = (1 − τ)(Kx − f − C) as long as the company remains operative
23and e(x) = (1 − τ)(rH − C) in case of liquidation while the payout policy to debt-holders is
d(x) = C. Then the company value is ￿ V (x) = ￿ E (x)+D(x) where ￿ E (x) = (1 − τ)[V (x) − D(x)]
with D(x) = C
r and V (x) as deﬁned in Proposition 1.
Consider next the case of risky debt. The payout policy to equity-holders is e(x) = (1−
τ)(Kx− f− C), as long as the company remains operative, and 0 in case of liquidation, while the
payout policy to debt-holders is d(x) = C as long as the company remains operative, and rH
in the case of liquidation. Then, following the steps outlined in Section 3, the company value is
￿ V (x) = ￿ E (x) + D(x), where ￿ E (x) = (1 − τ)E (x) with E (x) and D(x) given in Proposition 3.
Let x(t0) denote the demand level at the initial time t0 when the coupon value is chosen. In
Figure 4 we plot the coupon rate C
D(x(t0)) computed at the coupon value C that maximizes the
ﬁrm value ￿ V (x) at time t0 as a function of x(t0) and for values of τ = 0.25 (black line), τ = 0.3
(dotted line) and τ = 0.35 (grey line). Actually, the optimal C is increasing in τ and x(t0).
From Proposition 4, the greater is τ and/or x(t0) the lower the range of values of x such that
engaging in a last resort gamble is optimal and the lower are the distortions induced by these
gambles. Moreover, if x(t0) and/or τ is suﬃciently large, then from Proposition 3 we know that
it will never be optimal to engage in last resort gambles. Notice that for large values of x(t0)
the optimal coupon rate is decreasing in x(t0), given that for large values of x(t0) there is no
last resort gamble eﬀect and larger values of x(t0) correspond to a smaller credit risk. As shown
in the previous section, for low values of x(t0) debt capacity is increased by a last resort gamble
and decreases as x(t0) increases. Hence, for low values of x(t0) the last resort gamble eﬀect leads
to an increase in the riskiness and therefore in the optimal coupon rate, which vanishes as x(t0)
increases.
A ﬁnal issue concerns the agency costs of debt. Following Leland (1998) we deﬁne agency costs
as the diﬀerence between the optimal ﬁrm value before debt is in place (that is ex ante) and the
optimal ﬁrm value after debt is in place (that is ex-post). In Figure 5 we plot
V 0(x(t0))
￿ V (x(t0)) −1, where
V 0 (x) is deﬁned in Proposition 1 and ￿ V (x(t0)) is the value of the ﬁrm with the optimal capital







Figure 4: Optimal coupon rate C/D(x(t0)) as a function of x(t0) for τ = 0.25 (black line), τ = 0.3
(dotted line) and τ = 0.35 (grey line).
structure in place, as a function of x(t0) and for diﬀerent values of τ.
From Figure 5 we observe that agency costs are increasing in τ. ￿ V (x(t0)) is decreasing in
τ and thus the larger is τ the larger are the agency costs. We also observe that x(t0) has an
ambiguous eﬀect on agency costs. For large values of τ tax beneﬁts are most important. Thus
increasing x(t0) increases distortions due to tax beneﬁts and thus increases agency costs. For
low values of τ tax beneﬁts are less important while distortions due to last resort gambling are
more important, which may lead to decreasing agency costs for low values of x(t0) and increasing
agency costs for large values of x(t0) once the last resort gamble eﬀect vanishes.
5 Gambling intensity
In this section we generalize the results obtained in Section 3 introducing diﬀerent gambling
intensities. While in the previous sections the choice was either to invest in a risky project or not,
here we introduce the choice among diﬀerent risky projects with diﬀerent gambling intensities. As
an example we restrict our analysis to the case of two risky projects. The available projects are
i = 0,1,2 . The model can be extended straightforwardly to the case of n degrees of gambling








Figure 5: Agency costs as a function of x(t0) for τ = 0.2 (black line), τ = 0.275 (dotted line) and
τ = 0.35 (grey line).
intensities.
For the remaining part of the paper we make use of Assumption 2 which generalizes Assumption
1.





























r − µ + pi
r + pi
for each i = 0,1 and γ1 is suﬃciently large.
For given values of p1 and p2, Assumption 2 poses restrictions on gambling intensities γ1 and
γ2. To maintain the closure problem relevant, the capability to inﬂate current proﬁts must be
limited, posing an upper bound on γ2 (ﬁrst part of the inequality in Assumption 2 for i = 1).
To maintain the gambling problem relevant at diﬀerent gambling levels, the second part of the
inequality in Assumption 2, for i = 0,1, establishes a relationship between γ1 and γ2, deﬁning a
lower bound on γ2 as well as an upper and a lower bound on γ1.
Assumption 3 is required in order to have the choice of diﬀerent gambling levels meaningful
26for the relevant parameter conﬁgurations.





















The following Proposition characterizes the equity-holders and debt-holders claims in the case
of risky debt and shows that a gradual increase in gambling intensity is optimal as demand
decreases for low values of the coupon, while for large values of the coupon high gambling intensity
is never optimal.





E0 (x) for x0L < x
E1 (x) for x1L < x ≤ x0L
E2 (x) for x∗
2 < x ≤ x1L






D0 (x) for x0L < x
D1 (x) for x1L < x ≤ x0L
D2 (x) for x∗
2 < x ≤ x1L
0 for x ≤ x∗
2
where the closure threshold x∗
2 is deﬁned in (7), for i = 2, x1L is the solution of F1 (x) = 0, and
x0L is the solution of F0 (x) = 0, where F1 (x), F0 (x) and Ei (x), for i = 0,1,2, are deﬁned
in the Appendix, and where Assumptions 2 and 3 guarantee that x0L > x1L > x∗
2. For C > C
Proposition 3 applies, where Assumption 3 guarantees that C < ￿ C.
Proof. In the Appendix.
For coupon values lower than C the company increases the gambling intensity as x decreases.
For large values of x the company does not engage in a last resort gamble strategy (x > x0L). As x
decreases, the company starts to invest in the risky project 1 which corresponds to a low gambling
intensity γ1 (for x ∈ (x1L,x0L)). As x decreases further, the company increases its gambling
intensity, investing in the risky project 2 (for x ∈ (x∗
2,x1L)), delaying further liquidation. For
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Figure 6: Equity values E2 (x), continuous line, E1 (x), dotted line, and E0 (x), dashed line, for
coupon values C0 (black line) and C1 (grey line) with C1 > C0. Parameter values: σ = .25,
r = .05, µ = .001, p1 = .001, p2 = .005, γ1 = .005, γ2 = .0125, f = 1, K = H = 100, C0 = 10,
C1 = 20.
optimal to invest in the risky project 1 for some values of x. Thus, as C increases the intensity of
the last resort gambles decreases.
Remark 4 For values of C > rH, increasing the coupon value C reduces the last resort
gambling intensity.
Note that while in the previous section the gambling intensity was given, in this section here
the ﬁrm chooses between diﬀerent gambling intensities. A change in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure
leads the ﬁrm to choose a diﬀerent last resort gambling intensities. A higher coupon value leads
a ﬁrms to engage a less intense gambling strategy. In Figure 6 we depict a typical situation with
two diﬀerent coupon values C1 > C0. Observe that a larger coupon value reduces the range of
values of x where investing in project 1 is optimal (x0L(C1) − x1L(C1) > x0L (C0) − x1L (C0))
and where investing in project 2 is optimal (x1L (C1) − x∗
2 (C1) > x1L (C0) − x∗
2 (C0)). Moreover,
observe that the reduction in the latter range is larger than the reduction in the former one. For
28 
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Figure 7: For C < C we depict the gambling threshold for project 1 (black dotted line), for project
2 (black dashed line) and the liquidation threshold (black continuous line) as a function of C. For
C ≤ C < ￿ C we depict the gambling threshold for project 1 (gray dotted line) and the liquidation
threshold (gray continuous line) as a function of C.
a suﬃciently large coupon value, investing in project 2 will never be optimal, while investing in
project 1 remains optimal for some values of x.
In Figure 7 we depict an example of gamble and liquidation thresholds as a function of C.15
6 Conclusion
The problem of the relation between last resort gambles, debt and liquidation policies is set out in
this paper within a real option model. It is studied how the ﬁrm’s capital structure aﬀects corporate
liquidation and optimal last resort gamble strategies. Last resort gambles delay liquidation. On the
other side, increasing indebtedness reduces the range of values where it is optimal to engage in last
resort gambles. The way corporate ﬁnancial structure and last resort gamble strategies interact
is examined in Sections 3 and 4, where we characterize equity holders optimal strategies and debt
holders claims explicitly and provide both a formal analysis and a numerical implementation of
15 Parameter values are the same as in Figure 6.
29the model. Our analysis produces results which go beyond those obtained in asset-substitution
eﬀects models, both in terms of the impact of a last resort gamble on the debt value and the ﬁrm’s
debt capacity and in terms of the behaviour of the optimal coupon rate and agency costs. When
equity holders can play a last resort gamble strategy in order to increase the value of their assets,
some unexpected results may occur, that is, the debt capacity may increase, optimal coupon rates
may increase, agency costs may decrease, as it is shown in Sections 3 and 4.
Our model abstracts from conﬂicts of interests between manager and shareholders, arising from
the former’s propensity to divert ﬁrm resources to his own beneﬁt. One way to extend our model
and introduce also such conﬂict of interests is to follow Lambrecht and Myers (2005) framework,
where the manager maximizes the present value of the expected cash ﬂows, given the debt policy,
but is subject to the threat of collective action by shareholders, who can either close the ﬁrm or
manage it directly. Thus, the manager has to take into account such constraint and make payouts
to shareholders to prevent collective action. In this more complex setting, however, the main
results of our paper still hold, since the manager and equity holders basically split the surplus
from the ﬁrm according to ﬁxed fractions even in the event of liquidation, where both get nothing,
and also the eﬀects of a last resort gamble strategies are split between them.
Management could also misreport the state of the world to creditors. By introducing asym-
metric information it would be interesting to study the fraudulent aspect of last resort gambles.
Presumably, the last resort gamble eﬀects are weakened if the possibility of verifying the ﬁrm’s
situation by creditors is introduced. One could explore how endogenous capital structure may
act as an incentive device and under which circumstances the optimal debt policy can be used to
aﬀect last resort gamble strategies.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The solution to the diﬀerential equation (1) is






+ A1xλ0 + A2xβ
where λ0 and β are the negative and positive roots of (3), respectively. A no bubble condition
requires limx→∞(V 0 (x)− Kx
r−µ +
f
r) = 0 and thus A2 = 0. The solution to the diﬀerential equation
(1) is
V 1 (x) =
Kx






+ B1xλ1 + B2xε
where λ1 and ε are the negative and positive roots of (3), respectively. Since for large values of x
the option value of closure becomes negligible, B2 = 0. The value matching condition V 1 (￿ x1) = H
together with the smooth pasting condition V 1
x (￿ x1) = 0 deﬁne the closure threshold ￿ x1 and B1,
while the value matching condition V 1 (x0) = V 0 (x0) together with the smooth pasting condition
V 1
x (x0) = V 0
x (x0) deﬁne the gamble threshold x0 and the constant A1.
Substituting ￿ xi for i = 0,1, as deﬁned in (2), into F (x) we obtain
F (x) = (1 − λ0) K
r−µ (x − ￿ x0) − (1 − λ0) K











Assumption 1 guarantees that F (￿ x1) < 0 and since F (x) is a convex function where limx→∞ F (x) =
∞, a unique solution to F (x0) = 0 exists and moreover x0 > ￿ x1. Moreover, F (￿ x0) < 0 and thus,
following the same argument, we obtain x0 > ￿ x0 > ￿ x1.
33The result ∂￿ x1
∂p1 > 0 is straightforward since −λ1 and
r+p1−µ
r+p1 are both increasing in p1. Also
∂￿ x1
∂γ1 < 0 is straightforwardly obtained from ￿ x1. Taking the derivative of F (x) with respect to p1
we obtain
∂
∂p1F (x) = (1 − λ0) K





































∂p1 > 0, ∂￿ x1





< 1 for each x > ￿ x1, we have ∂
∂p1F (x) > 0 for each x > ￿ x1.
As a consequence, x0 is decreasing in p1.
Taking the derivative of F (x) with respect to γ1 we obtain
∂

















Note that the second term in the parenthesis is larger than the second term and consequently the
whole parenthesis is positive which, since ∂￿ x1
∂γ1 < 0, implies that ∂
∂γ1F (x) < 0 and consequently
∂x0
∂γ1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. We divide the proof into two parts. In part (a) we show the
content of Proposition 3 (i). In part (b) we show that ￿ C exists.
Part (a). To compute Di(x), let us solve the following diﬀerential equation:









for i = 0 for x > x0R and i = 1 for x∗
1 < x ≤ x0R. The general solution of (8) is
C+piH
r+pi + Lixλi
for some Li, if we take the no-bubble condition into account. We determine L1 employing the
boundary condition D1(x∗
1) = H and L0 employing the value matching condition D0 (x0R) =
D1 (x0R).
The value of the equity-holders’ claim E(x) is obtained solving the diﬀerential equations:





xxx2, for x > x0R
rE1 = Kx +
γ1
1 + p1









1 < x ≤ x0R










for some A,B, if we take the no-bubble conditions into account. Then, we determine A,B,x∗
1,x0R
employing the value-matching and the smooth-pasting conditions E1(x∗
1) = 0, E1
x(x∗
1) = 0,
E0(x0R) = E1(x0R) and E0
x(x0R) = E1
x(x0R).
Part (b). Using the deﬁnition of x∗
i (7) we can rewrite FR (x)
FR (x) = (1 − λ0) K
r−µ (x − x∗
0) − (1 − λ0) K














and hence FR (x∗
1) < 0 if and only if x∗
1 < x∗
0. Thus, engaging in a last resort gamble strategy
is optimal (i.e.x0R > x∗
1) if and only if x∗
0 > x∗
1. Note that FR (x∗























r + p1 − µ
r + p1
< 0 (9)
Since for C = rH, Assumption 1 implies that x∗
1 < x∗
0, and since, for C → ∞, x∗
1 > x∗
0, by
continuity there exists a unique value of C such that x∗
0 = x∗





∂C , ∂ ￿ C
∂p1 < 0. For each C < ￿ C, x∗
1 < x∗
0 and thus FR (x∗
1) < 0 and as a consequence
x0R > x∗
1, while for each C ≥ ￿ C, x∗
1 ≥ x∗
0 and thus FR (x∗
1) > 0 and as a consequence x0R ≥ x∗
1.
The proof of the sign of the derivatives ∂x0R




∂p1 > 0 and
∂x∗
1
∂γ1 < 0 is the same
as the one in the Proof of Proposition 1.




∂C has already been proved in
the proof of Proposition 3.
In this proof we calculate the sign of the derivative
∂(x0R−x∗
1)







r + p1 − µ
￿
(x0R − x∗






















35and where, since x0R > x∗
1 and λ1 < 1, g(x0R,x∗
1) > 0.














1) = 0;(ii) L(x0R,x∗
1) is strictly increasing in x0R;
(iii) limx0R→∞ L(x0R,x∗
1) = − 1
r+p1−µ (λ0 − λ1) 1
λ1.


























































(i) From (13) it is easy to see that L(x∗
1,x∗
1) = 0.

















(iii) Since λ1 < 0, it follows that limx0R→∞ L(x0R,x∗
1) = − 1
r+p1−µ (λ0 − λ1) 1
λ1.






































∂C on the left-hand-side of (14) and rearranging terms we
obtain

























In the following we show that the numerator as well as the denominator of the right-hand-side of
(15) are positive.
We now proceed to prove that the numerator of (15) is negative. The ﬁrst term of the numerator
is negative (see the ﬁrst part of this proof) while the second term, since L(x0R,x∗
1) ≥ 0 and
∂x∗
1
∂C > 0, is positive. Since L(x0R,x∗
1) is strictly increasing in x0R, a suﬃcient condition for the






































Rearranging further terms yields
λ0 (λ1 − 1)µp1 + (λ0 − λ1)rp1 > 0
which is always true.
Next we show that the denominator of (15) is positive. Using (11) the numerator reads
M (x0R,x∗

















Note that M (x0R,x∗








r + p1 − µ
￿
> 0
Thus, since x0R > x∗
1 it is suﬃcient to prove that M (x∗
1,x∗
1) > 0, whereM (x∗
1,x∗
1) > 0 can be
rewritten as













(λi − 1) = r + pi − µ
Note that the right-hand-side of this expression is positive valued by Assumption 1 (which implies
that λi
1















Simplifying and rearranging terms we obtain −λ1 > −λ0, which is true.
Proof of Proposition 5. Under the risky debt assumption the value of the equity-holders’
claim satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation:




σ2Exxx2 + pi ￿
−Ei￿
(18)
for i = 0,1,2 .
We assume that both gambling intensities are active and calculate the equity value and gamble
and closure thresholds, and afterwards we show that this is true for suﬃciently low coupon values
(i.e. C < C).
From (18), imposing value matching conditions E2 (x0L) = E1 (x0L), E1 (x1L) = E0 (x1L) and
E0 (x2) = 0 we obtain

















































































































38where gambling thresholds x1L and x0L are obtained imposing smooth pasting conditions E2
x(x) =
E1
x (x) and E1
x (x) = E0
x (x), F1 (x) and F0 (x) are deﬁned as follows:





































































and closure threshold x∗
2 solve the smooth pasting condition E2
x (x) = 0.
In the following we show that C exists. In particular, we ﬁrst show that Assumption 2 guar-
antees that as long as debt is risk-free the inequality x0L > x1L > x∗
2 holds and then we show that
increasing riskiness of the debt value there exists a critical coupon value below which engaging in
last resort gambling behavior with intensity 2 is optimal for some values of x, while above this
threshold last resort gambling with intensity 2 is never optimal.




the proof into two parts: (a) x1L > x∗
2 and (b) x0L > x1L.
Part (a). F1 (x) is a convex function of x. Thus, to prove that x1L > x∗
2 we show that
F1 (x∗
2) < 0. Using (7) we can rewrite F1 (x) as
F1 (x) = (1 − λ1) K
r+p1−µ (x − x∗
1) − (1 − λ1) K














and hence F1 (x∗
2) ≤ 0 if and only if x∗
1 > x∗
2, which is satisﬁed by Assumption 2. Moreover, since
x∗
1 > x∗
2 and λ2 < 0, from (19) it follows that F1 (x∗
1) < 0. Hence, x1L > x∗
1 > x∗
2. Thus, investing
in the risky project 2 is optimal (i.e. x1L > x∗
2) if and only if x∗
1 > x∗
2.
Part (b). To prove that x0L > x1L holds for suﬃciently large values of γ1 we rewrite, using
39(7), F0 (x) as
F0 (x) = (1 − λ0) K
r−µ (x − x∗
0) − (1 − λ0) K































< 1, F0 (x∗
0) < 0 and consequently x0L > x∗
0.
Observe that there always exists a value of γ1 such that x∗
1 = x∗
2. In this case condition F1 (x) = 0
yields x1L = x∗
1, while condition F0 (x) = 0 yields x0L > x∗
0 and thus we obtain, x0L > x∗
0 > x∗
1 =
x1L. By continuity inequality x0L > x1L holds for suﬃciently large values of γ1.






0) and as a consequence there




1 and thus for C > C gambling intensity 2 is no longer
optimal, while gambling intensity 1 remains optimal for some values of x as stated in Proposition
3.
To compute D(x), let us solve the following diﬀerential equation (8) for i = 0 for x > x0L, i = 1
for x1L < x ≤ x0L and i = 2 for x∗
2 < x ≤ x1L. The general solution of (8) is
C+piH
r+pi +Lixλi for some
Li, if we take the no-bubble condition into account. We determine L2 employing the boundary
condition D2(x∗
2) = H and L1 and L0 employing the value matching conditions D2 (x1L) =










































D0 (x) = C
r +
￿
C+p1H
r+p1 − C
r
￿￿
x
x0L
￿λ0
+
￿
C+p2H
r+p2 −
C+p1H
r+p1
￿￿
x0L
x1L
￿λ1−λ0 ￿
x
x1L
￿λ0
+
￿
H −
C+p2H
r+p2
￿￿
x1L
x∗
2
￿λ2−λ1 ￿
x0L
x∗
2
￿λ1−λ0 ￿
x
x∗
2
￿λ0
40